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1 Introduction
My point of departure is a recent defence of the “Australian Plan” for a
paraconsistent negation by Berto and Restall in [1] against a recent attack
by De and Omori in [4], defending the “American Plan”. The heart of the
controversy is whether to define paraconsistent negation model-theoretically
by means of four-valued matrices (with gluts and gaps) or via frames of
“points” (going also by the names ‘situations’, ‘states’, or ‘cases’ in general).
In this paper, I aim at presenting another plan, that shares some features
with the Australian plan on the one hand, but radically departs from the
latter on the other hand.
The central idea in the Australian plan is ([1], p. 3):
whether ¬ϕ holds here depends on whether ϕ holds elsewhere,
where ‘here’ refers to some point (of evaluation) and ‘elsewhere’ refers to
evaluation at some other point. Thus, negation is rendered by the Australian
plan as a point-shift operator, much like a modality with Kripke model-theory.
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:5) 2019, Article no. 1
160
I want to adopt the shift-view of negation, but change the paradigm: instead
of shifting points, shift formulas. Thus,
whether ¬ϕ holds (“here”) depends on whether a certain different ψ holds
(“here” too).
This paradigm makes “here” redundant, as it does to the whole idea of using
frames of points.
Another idea of [1] I adopt is that negation is an exclusion operator, grounded
on a primitive notion of incompatibility. This term has been used extensively
in the literature, alas in different senses. For example, Restall [13] uses it as
a relation between states (points) in an incompatibility frame, in the spirit of
the Australian plan. Brandom [2] uses incompatibility as relation between
sets of sentences and subsets of the power-set of sentences; and there are
more.
In my plan the relata of incompatibility change: the are not associated with
points, but are formulas and finite sets of simple formulas (conjunctions
of atomic formulas) with an imposed primitive incompatibility on atomic
sentences!
The key feature of my plan is not that it leads to paraconsistency, but rather
that it leads to (a family of) contra-classical logics. But in contrast to other
ways of obtaining contra-classicality, my plan obtains it without “loosing”
classical validities, by avoiding closure under uniform substitution. Atomic
formulas have an “absolute” deductive role.
My plan departs from standard conventions in yet another way. Usually,
atomic formulas are considered independent of each other. In a model-theory
based on valuations assigning truth-values to formulas, a valuation assigns
a truth-value to an atomic formula independently of the truth-values it as-
signs to any other atomic formulas. According to my plan, there are depen-
dencies among atomic formulas. In particular, (mutual) incompatibility is
attributed by a model to (finite) collections of atomic formulas, constraining
their truth-values. When used to define negation, the resulting negation is
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not just excluding an assertion, but also suggesting the truth of another as-
sertion, an incompatible alternative to the excluded assertion. This approach
is particularly suitable for a view according to which formulas are a “behind
the scene regimentations” of some natural language sentences, and their in-
terdependency incorporates into the logic some material connections. In [6],
this kind of negation is called1 conversational negation, and is traced back to
its origins in the linguistics literature.
Note that I am referring continuously to atomic formulas, not to propositional
variables, as the generators of compound formulas. Indeed, this view does not
support uniform substitutions, that would not preserve relationships among
atomic formulas imposed by my plan.
Applying such an approach, for example, to obtain a Relevance Logic might
impose relevance of one atomic sentence to another one, going beyond the
traditional syntactic property of variable sharing in defining relevant impli-
cation and relevant consequence.
2 Atomic incompatibility bases
In the sequel, I assume a propositional object language freely-generated by
a set P = {pi | i ≥ 0} of atomic formulas, ranged over by meta-variables
p, q. For convenience, I assume the standard connectives: ‘¬’ (negation), ‘∧’
(conjunction), ‘∨’ (disjunction and ‘→’ (conditional). I use ϕ, ψ as meta-
variables ranging over formulas, α, β over conjunctions2 of atomic formulas
and Γ, ∆ - over finite sets of formulas.
Definition 2.1 (atomic incompatibility base) An atomic incompatibil-
ity base is a mapping i : P ⇒ Pf (P )/∅ (i.e., the range of i consists of finite,
non-empty subsets of atomic formulas), s.t.:
1The main interest in that paper is in computational means of identfying “plausible”
alternatives to the negated sentence.
2Where convenient, a conjunction of atomic formulas is also considered as the finite set
of its those atoms.
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•
(nref) p 6∈i(p) (2.1)
•
(sym) p ∈ i(q) iff q ∈ i(p) (2.2)
•
(part) If p ∈ i(q) then i(p) = (i(q)/{p})∪{q} (2.3)
Remarks:
1. By definition, for every p ∈ P, i(p) 6= ∅. Each atomic formula has at
least one (other) atomic formula incompatible with it.
2. Incompatibility is irreflexive, symmetric and transitive.
3. The mapping i partitions P into incompatibility classes s.t. for every
incompatibility class IC: if p, q ∈ IC then p ∈ i(q) (and, hence,
q ∈ i(p)). Clearly, incompatibility classes are not equivalence classes,
as incompatibility is not reflexive.
The intention is that truth-values are assigned in such a way that in every
incompatibility class there is exactly one true member.
To direct the thought, the reader may think of a generic incompatibility class
as a representation of colours3, where atomic formulas regiment sentences
assigning a colour to some specific object, say o. Clearly, o can have exactly
one colour (all over).
Next, the mapping i is extended to iˆ, mapping also compound formulas. The
range of iˆ consists of conjunctions of atomic formulas.
Definition 2.2 (proper conjunctions of atoms) A conjunction of atoms
α = ∧2≤j≤mpj is i-proper, denoted by pi(α), if no qj1 and qj2 (for j1 6= j2) are
in the same IC of i.
3For simplicity, assume there are only five colours: red, green, blue, white and black.
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A conjunction of atoms α which is not proper is improper. The role of being
proper will become clear in the sequel.
Definition 2.3
iˆ(p) = {q∧α| q ∈ i(p), pi(α), p 6∈ α} (2.4)
iˆ(¬ϕ) = ∩α∈iˆ(ϕ)iˆ(α) (2.5)
iˆ(ϕ∧ψ) = iˆ(ϕ)∪iˆ(ψ) (2.6)
iˆ(ϕ∨ψ) = iˆ(ϕ)∩iˆ(ψ) (2.7)
iˆ(ϕ→ψ) = iˆ(¬ϕ)∩iˆ(ψ) (2.8)
Note that for every ϕ, iˆ(ϕ) contains only i-proper atomic conjunctions.
Example 2.1 For better readability, suppose we have the mnemonically-
named atomic formulas.
{red, green, blue, short, long}
Consider an atomic incompatibility base i0 satisfying
i0(red) = {green, blue} i0(green) = {red, blue}, i0(blue) = {red, green}
i0(short) = {long}, i0(long) = {short}
To avoid notational clutter and in anticipation of Definition 4.7, only relevant
representatives of iˆ0 are shown. The conjunctions generated by (2.4) are
displayed modulo their commutativity.
iˆ(red) =
{blue∧short, green∧short,
blue∧long, green∧long}
iˆ(green) =
{blue∧short, red∧short,
blue∧long, red∧long}
iˆ(blue) =
{red∧short, green∧short,
red∧long, green∧long}
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iˆ(long) = {blue∧short, green∧short, red∧short}
iˆ(short) = {blue∧long, green∧long, red∧long}
iˆ0(red∧long) = iˆ0(red)∪iˆ0(long) =
{blue∧short, green∧short,
blue∧long, green∧long,
red∧short}
iˆ0(red∨long) = iˆ0(red)∩iˆ0(long) = {blue∧short, green∧short}
iˆ0(¬red) = {red∧short, red∧long}
iˆ0(¬(red∧long)) = {red∧long}
iˆ0(red→long) = iˆ0(¬red)∩iˆ0(long) = {red∧short}
iˆ0(¬(red→long)) = {red∧long}
iˆ0(red∨¬red) = ∅
iˆ0(red∧¬red) =
{blue∧short, green∧short,
blue∧long, green∧long,
red∧short, red∧long}
From Definition (2.3) we have:
Corollary 1 (non-reflexivity) For every α: α 6∈ iˆ(α).
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that for some α = q1∧ · · · ∧ql, l ≥ 1
α ∈ iˆ(α) = ∪1≤i≤lˆi(qi)
W.l.o.g, assume α ∈ iˆ(q1) = {p∧β | p ∈ iˆ(q1), q1 6∈ β}.
But this is impossible, as q1, a conjunct in α, cannot be p because q1 6∈ i(q1)
and cannot be in β.
Corollary 2 (negation) For every ϕ
iˆ(ϕ)∩iˆ(¬ϕ) = ∅ (2.9)
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Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that for some α
α ∈ iˆ(ϕ)∩iˆ(¬ϕ)
But iˆ(¬ϕ) = ∩β∈iˆ(ϕ)iˆ(β), and α is one of those βs. Hence, α ∈ iˆ(α), contra-
dicting the non-reflexivity Corollary 1.
3 Truth and consequence
The main point in the definition of truth (in a model) is that the atomic
formulas in every incompatibility class are assigned a truth-value in a coor-
dinated way, not independently of each other. In particular, some p ∈ IC is
assigned f iff some q ∈ i(p) is assigned t.
Definition 3.4 (i-valuations) For a given atomic incompatibility base i, a
i-valuation v is a a mapping P ⇒ {t, f} s.t
v[[p]] =
{
t iff for every q ∈ i(p) v[[q]] = f
f iff for some q ∈ i(p) v[[q]] = t (3.10)
For example, the atomic formula, say p, expressing the proposition ‘o is
red (all over)’ is false iff one of the incompatible atomic formulas q ∈ i(p),
expressing the proposition that o has another colour (all over), is true.
A i-valuation is naturally extended to compound formulas very much like
in familiar definitions, but with truth under a valuation depending “in the
background” on the atomic incompatibility base i.
v[[¬ϕ]] = t iff v[[ϕ]] = f
v[[ϕ∧ψ]] = t iff v[[ϕ]] = t and v[[ψ]] = t
v[[ϕ∨ψ]] = t iff v[[ϕ]] = t or v[[ψ]] = t
v[[ϕ→ψ]] = t iff v[[ϕ]] = f or v[[ψ]] = t
(3.11)
An immediate corollary of (3.11) is that v[[¬¬ϕ]] = v[[ϕ]].
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The next theorem extends the dependency of truth on incompatible atomic
sentences to compound formulas. It underlies the property of negation being
not just excluding (the negated formula) but requiring the truth of one of
the incompatible alternatives of the negated formula.
Definition 3.5 (truth characteristics) A set of conjunctions of atoms j(ϕ)
is a truth characteristics (t-characteristics) for ϕ under i iff for every i-
valuation v:
v[[ϕ]] =
{
t iff for every α ∈ j(ϕ) v[[α]] = f
f iff for some α ∈ j(ϕ) v[[α]] = t (3.12)
Theorem 3.1 (truth and incompatibility) For every ϕ and every i-valuation
v, iˆ(ϕ) is the4 t-characteristic for ϕ under i.
Spelled out in detail: For every ϕ and every i-valuation v:
v[[ϕ]] =
{
t iff for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ) v[[α]] = f
f iff for some α ∈ iˆ(ϕ) v[[α]] = t (3.13)
Proof. The proof is by a simple induction on ϕ. I show the proof of one
direction only, the proof of the other direction being similar. Fix an arbitrary
i-valuation v.
Basis: The basis is when ϕ = p, an atomic formula, and is given by (3.10).
Step: Assume (3.1) holds for ϕi, i = 1, 2.
ϕ = ϕ1∧ϕ2: Suppose v[[ϕ]] = t. By (3.11), v[[ϕ1]] = t and v[[ϕ2]] = t.
By the induction hypothesis, for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ1) v[[α]] = f and for
every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ2) v[[α]] = f . Therefore, for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ1) ∪iˆ(ϕ2)
v[[α]] = f .
4Uniqueness follows from the ‘iff’ in (3.12).
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ϕ = ϕ1∨ϕ2: By (3.11), v[[ϕ1]] = t or v[[ϕ2]] = t. W.l.o.g, assume the
former. By the induction hypothesis, for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ1) v[[α]] = f .
Therefore, for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ1) ∩iˆ(ϕ2) v[[α]] = f .
ϕ = ϕ1→ϕ2: By (3.11), v[[ϕ1]] = f or v[[ϕ2]] = t.
v[[ϕ1]] = f : By (3.11), v[[¬ϕ1]] = t. By the induction hypothesis,
for every α ∈ iˆ(¬ϕ1) v[[α]] = f . Therefore, for every α ∈
iˆ(¬ϕ1) ∩iˆ(ϕ2) v[[α]] = f .
v[[ϕ2]] = t: By the induction hypothesis, for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ2) v[[α]] =
f . Therefore, for every α ∈ iˆ(¬ϕ1) ∩iˆ(ϕ2) v[[α]] = f .
ϕ = ¬ϕ1: By (3.11), v[[ϕ1]] = f . By the induction hypothesis, for some
α ∈ iˆ(ϕ1) v[[α]] = t. Therefore, for every χ ∈ iˆ(α) v[[χ]] = f ,
implying that for every χ ∈ ∩α∈iˆ(ϕ1)iˆ(α) = f .
Proposition 3.1 (double negation incompatibility)
iˆ(¬¬ϕ) = iˆ(ϕ) (3.14)
Proof. It is immediately seen that iˆ(¬¬ϕ) is a t-characteristics for ϕ under
i (and iˆ(ϕ) is a t-characteristics for ¬¬ϕ under i) and so both are equal.
The definition of the model-theoretic notions of consequence and validity also
resemble their usual definition, but they “hide” a different notion of truth
and falsity in a model.
Definition 3.6 (consequence, validity)
i-consequence: For a given atomic incompatibility base i, ψ is a (logical)
i-consequence of Γ, denoted Γ|=iϕ, iff for every i-valuation v: v[[ψ]] = t
whenever v[[ϕ]] = t for every ϕ ∈ Γ.
i-validity: ϕ is i-valid iff ∅|=iϕ.
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An immediate corollary of the definition of i-consequence is the following.
Proposition 3.2 (Tarskian consequence relation) |=i is a Tarskian con-
sequence relation for every atomic compatibility base i.
We can regard every atomic incompatibility base i and its associated conse-
quence relation |=i as inducing a contra-classical logic Li
Observation: Every i-valuation is also a classical valuation, but not vice
versa. Therefore, every classical validity (a tautology) is by definition also
i-valid for every atomic compatibility base i. However, there are classically
contingent formulas (i.e. classical non-tautologies), that may be i-valid for
some i, because the refuting classical valuation is not a i-valuation for that i
(see Example 3.2 below).
It is important to realise that not “loosing” classical tautologies does not
contradict the post-completeness of classical logic, because each Li is not
closed under uniform substitution, the latter being essential in the proof that
adding validities to classical logic results in inconsistency.
By the same token, every classical contradiction is a i-contradiction for ev-
ery atomic incompatibility base i. However, there are classically contingent
formulas which are i-contradictions for some atomic incompatibility base i,
because their satisfying classical valuations are not i-valuations for that i.
Thus, contra-classical logics are emerging from this definition of negation!
Example 3.2 Let ϕ be p∨q for p, q different atomic formulas. Clearly, p∨q
is not classically valid. It is refuted by the classical valuation vˆ by which both
vˆ[[p]] = f and vˆ[[q]] = f . Consider now an atomic compatibility base i where
i(p) = {q}, i(q) = {p}. A i-valuation enforces vˆ[[p]] 6= vˆ[[q]] and, therefore, vˆ
is not a i-valuation. No i-valuation can refute p∨q, and so |=iˆp∨q.
In addition, for the same i,
p|=i¬q
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Again, this is not a classically valid consequence, but a refuting valuation is
not a i-valuation.
Similarly, ¬(p∨q), classically contingent, is a i-contradiction for the above i.
It has no i-valuation validating it.
Theorem 3.2 (i-validity characterisation) For every atomic compatibil-
ity base i:
|=iϕ iff iˆ(ϕ) = ∅ (3.15)
Proof.
only if: Suppose |=iϕ, and assume, towards a contradiction, that α ∈ iˆ(ϕ).
Since α is i-proper, for some i-valuation v v[[α]] = t. But then, by (3.1)
v[[ϕ]] = f , contradicting the i-validity of ϕ.
if: Suppose that iˆ(ϕ) = ∅. Consider an arbitrary i-valuation v. By the
emptiness assumption, it holds vacuously that v[[α]] = f for every α ∈
iˆ(ϕ). Hence, by (3.1), v[[ϕ]] = t. Since v is arbitrary, ϕ is i-valid.
4 Natural deduction for Li
In this section I introduce, for each i, a natural deduction system Ni, cap-
turing |=i. The idea is to use iˆ itself within the I/E-rules.
Remark: The presence of iˆ in the I/E-rules is analogous to the presence
of worlds (and their accessibility relation) in natural-deduction systems for
modal logics. See [7] and [12], and further references herein.
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4.1 Restricting iˆ to finite sets
There is a difficulty of using iˆ in the proof-system, namely the fact that iˆ(ϕ)
can, in general, contain infinitely many conjunctions of atoms. However,
since ϕ may have only finitely many atomic formulas as sub-formulas, only
finitely many of the conjunctions in iˆ(ϕ) are relevant to its deductive role.
So, the first step is to restrict iˆ(ϕ) to its finitely many relevant conjunctions.
Definition 4.7 (restricting iˆ) Let iˆr(ϕ) =
df. {α/a(ϕ) | α ∈ iˆ(ϕ)}.
Clearly, iˆr(ϕ) is finite for every ϕ. Furthermore, iˆr(ϕ) preserves Theorem
3.1.
4.2 The I/E-rules
By inspecting (3.11) one can realise that Gentzen’s positive rules in NK,
except the I/E-rules for negation, can be carried over to Ni.
For negation, I introduce the following I/E-rules.
α¬ϕ (¬Ii), α ∈ iˆr(ϕ)
¬ϕ
[α1]j1
...
χ · · ·
[αm]jm
...
χ
χ (¬Ej1,··· ,jmi ), iˆr(ϕ) = {α1, · · · , αm}
(4.16)
Definition 4.8 (i-consistency) Γ is i-consistent iff for no ϕ both Γ`Niϕ
and Γ`Ni¬ϕ
Theorem 4.3 (soundness of Ni) If Γ`Niϕ tren Γ|=iϕ
Proof. Fix some i. For every rule, I show that if an i-valuation v i-satisfies
its premises, then v i-satisfies its conclusion. The claim then follows by
induction on the derivation in Ni.
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The only non-standard case is negation.
¬Ii: Assume that for some α ∈ iˆ(ϕ) v[[α]] = t. By (3.1), v[[ϕ]] = f . Therefore,
by (3.11) v[[¬ϕ]] = t.
¬Ei: Assume that v[[¬ϕ]] = t. By (3.11), v[[ϕ]] = f . By (3.1), there is some
αj ∈ i(ϕ) s.t. v[[αj]] = t. By the induction hypothesis on the jth minor
premise of (¬Ei), v[[χ]] = t.
Theorem 4.4 (completeness of Ni) For every atomic incompatibility base
i:
If Γ|=iϕ then Γ`Niϕ (4.17)
Proof. The proof is almost like the analog proof for propositional classi-
cal logic, with one additional important detail. Assuming that Γ|=iϕ but
Γ0Niϕ, a counter model is obtained via the Lindenbaum lemma, applied to
i-consistency, embedding Γ in a maximally-i-consistent set Γˆ. The additional
burden of proof is to show that the valuation v defined by
v[[p]] = t off p ∈ Γˆ
extended as usual to
v[[ϕ]] = t iff ϕ ∈ Γˆ
is indeed an i-valuation. For that, one needs to establish that if ϕ ∈ Γˆ, then
α 6∈ Γˆ for every α ∈ iˆ(ϕ).
Assume, towards a contradiction, that both ϕ ∈ Γˆ and α ∈ Γˆ for some
α ∈ iˆ(ϕ). Then, for some n ≥ 0, both ϕ ∈ Γn and α ∈ Γn. But then, both
Γn`Niϕ and Γn`Ni¬ϕ, the latter by applying (¬Ii) to α, contradicting the
i-consistency of Γn.
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5 Atomic incompatibility bases and metaphys-
ical grounding
Metaphysical grounding (henceforth, grounding) is a philosophical notion
used for explaining the structure of reality (see [14] for a general introduc-
tion). Mostly, it is taken as a relation of dependency of a fact on a set of facts,
where a fact is taken as (expressed by) a true proposition. I will conflate the
use of those notions and speak mainly about the latter, to remain closer
to the level of syntax. Being a dependency relation, grounding is typically
considered as a partial ordering over facts.
Because grounding’s relata are true propositions, expressed by sentences, it
is natural to associate logics with grounds in order to specify the properties
of this relation. Two well known logics of grounding are presented in [5] and
[3]. A more recent one can be found in [9].
As mentioned in [10], one of the difficulties in devising logics for groundings
is the treatment of negation. As noted in [8], both in Fine’s logic [5] and in
Coreia’s logic [3], negation, differently from conjunction and disjunction, is
treated only in its interaction with other connectives.
In [9], Poggiolesi proposes an elaborate, rather complicated, logic for ground-
ing, that has also rules for negation. Remarkably, for atomic propositions,
Poggiolesi’s insight’s is very similar to that of the current paper. She notes
that the truth of the negated atomic proposition the ball is not cubic can be
grounded in the truth of the atomic proposition the ball is spherical, expressed
in my terms,
cubic ∈ iˆ(spherical) and spherical ∈ iˆ(cubic)
(together with the other possible shapes). However, this is not followed by
an expansion into a definition of grounding negated compound formulas as I
do.
Without attempting here to devise a full logic of grounds, I do propose the
following definition for grounds of negated formulas.
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Definition 5.9 (ultimate grounds for negation) The ultimate grounds
of ¬ϕ, denoted by g[[¬ϕ]], are defined by
g[[¬ϕ]] =df. iˆr(ϕ) (5.18)
That is, the grounds of a negated sentence are positive incompatible sentences
of a particularly simple form.
For example, the ball is green (all over) is one of the ultimate grounds of the
ball is not red (all over).
I refer to g[[¬ϕ]] as ‘ultimate5’ because of its constitution only of conjunctions
of atomic formulas. In a sense, this notion of grounding is a kind of tran-
sitive closure of more common definitions of grounding, grounding negated
sentences on “atomic facts” only, the latter conceivable as “building blocks”
of reality.
I believe that a general notion of ultimate grounds is worth pursuing for
arbitrary truths, not just negated ones. I leave this for further research.
6 Conclusions
I presented a plan for negation, proposing a paradigm shift from the Aus-
tralian plan, leading to a family of contra-classical logics Li. The two main
ideas are the following:
1. Instead of shifting points of evaluation (in a frame), shift the evaluated
formula.
2. Introduce an incompatibility set for every atomic formula, extended to
any compound formula, and impose the condition on valuations that a
formula evaluates to true iff all the formulas in its incompatibility set
evaluate to false. Thus, atomic sentences are not independent in their
truth-values.
5This notion can be thought of as an opposite pf Poggiolesi’s ‘immediate grounds’.
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:5) 2019, Article no. 1
174
I have also presented a sound and complete natural deduction proof system
Ni for every Li.
In addition, the kind of negation considered in this paper is shown to provide
an innovative notion of grounding negation.
By imposing other (than incompatibility) relations among atomic formulas
as restricting valuation, other families of logics can be obtained. I pursue
elsewhere variations on this theme.
What about paraconsistency and paracompleteness?
I believe the right way to obtain them is to change the definition of logical
consequence, not of the meanings of the connectives. Adopting Priest’s null
account in [11] leads to the following definition of logical consequence, both
paraconsistent and paracomplete:
For a given atomic incompatibility base i, ψ is a (logical) i-consequence of Γ,
denoted Γ|=iϕ, iff:
1. Γ is i-consistent, and
2. ¬ψ is i-consistent, and
3. for every i-valuation v: v[[ψ]] = t whenever v[[ϕ]] = t for every ϕ ∈ Γ.
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